Hubbard report of engagementUSS PC-815
SERIAL 167
24 MAY 1943
ANTI-SUBMARINE ACTION BY SURFACE SHIP, REPORT OF
FORWARDS REPORT OF ACTION AND VARIOUS
OTHER REPORTS AND STATEMENTS BY MEMBERS
OF THE CREW, COVERING ACTION OF 19-21
MAY 1943 WHILE EN ROUTE FROM ASTORIA
TO SAN DIEGO FOR SHAKE DOWN CRUISE –
FIRST CONTACT AT 0344 LCT IN LAT. 45, 28N,
LONG. 124.20 W. (CO LT L. RON HUBBARD,
USNR).
IN REPLY REFER
TO NO.
PC815/A16-3            U. S. S. PC-815
(167)
SECRET
c/o Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
May 24, 1943.
From:  The Commanding Officer.
To :     The Commander in Chief, PACIFIC Fleet.
Via :    (1)            The Commanding Officer, Naval Station,
Astoria, Oregon.
(2) The Commander, NORTHWEST Sea Frontier.
Subject..            Battle Report - submission of.
Enclosures.
(A)      Battle Report. – P.2
(B)       Chart of Area Marked With Attacks. – missing
(C)             Chemical Recorder Traces. – P.21
(D)            Executive Officer’s Report After Battle. – P.27
(E)       Copy of Gunnery Log of U.S.S. P.C. 815. - P.28
(F)       Radio Log of U.S.S. P.C. 815, - P.30
(G)      Copy of Radio Operator's Log, Naval Station, Astoria, Oregon. – P.56.
(H)            Statements from Members of the Crew of
U.S.S. P.C. 815. - P.93
(I)        Series of Pictures Taken At Scene of Action. – P.105
1.         The Battle Report for the action which took place May 19-21, 1943 is
respectfully submitted herewith.
L. RON HUBBARD
Copy to:
CC NAVSTA., Astoria, Oregon
COMNOWESTSEAFRON
SECRET
IN REPLY REFER
TO NO.
U. S. S. PC-815
AN ACCOUNT OF THE ACTION OFF CAPE LOOKOUT
Acting under the orders of the Commander of Operational Training Command,
Pacific Fleet. 161909 of May, the U.S.S. PC815 got under weigh [sic] from
Astoria at 2116 May 18, 1943 enroute [sic] to San Diego. California to undergo
Shakedown.
At the time of departure this vessel was reasonably ready for action. officers
and crew having been constantly drilled and taught since January 20, 1943 at
which time, with a few exceptions, the complement had reported to Portland.
Oregon for duty in connection with fitting out and construction.
Proceeding southward just inside the steamer track an echo ranging contact was
made by the soundman then on duty, Grover, E.N., Soundman Third class. The
Commanding Officer had the conn and immediately slowed all engines to ahead one
third to better echo ranging conditions, and placed the contact dead ahead, 500
yards away.
The first contact was very good. The target was moving left and away. The
bearing was clear. The night was moonlit and the sea was flat calm. No ships of
any kind were in sight or expected. Screw noises, fluttering and without
pulsation, were distinct on the bearing and quite different from the pulsations
of our own screws, The extent of bearing was about eighteen degrees with the
mushiness of a wake to the right, The U.S.S. PC815 closed in to 360 yards,
meanwhile sounding general quarters. Depth charge levers on the signal bridge
were not used because contact was lost at 360 yards.
The range was quickly opened out and a search made of the area with echo ranging
equipment. Contact was regained at 800 yards and was held on the starboard beam
while further investigation was made. Screws were present and distinct as
before. The bearing was still clear. Smoke signal identification was watched for
closely and when none appeared it was concluded that the target must not be a
friendly submarine. All engines were brought up to speed, fifteen knots and the
target was brought dead ahead with ship on course 240 T.
- 2 -
The target turned away and a lead angle was applied at which time the movement
of the target was ascertained. The ship swung back to an intercepting course,
crossed over the target ahead of it and laid the first barrage. Structural
firing-charges were in the K-guns and did not explode. The three charges rolled
exploded at their settings two for 100 feet one for fifty feet. The contact was
lost at 100 yards indicating a target depth of 100 feet.
Attack 1 concluded (see chart and chemical recorder trace).the range was opened
well out on standard procedure and closed again on the side toward which the
target had been turning, The depth charge boil was easily ranged upon but up to
800 yards but difficulty was experienced in picking up the actual target. When
screw noises and the metallic quality of the contact reestablished contact. the
ship came up to attack speed and made a run. The target was found to be turning
back toward the depth charge distance. Contact was lost at 200 yards indicating
that the target had dived. A four charge pattern was laid, two from the racks
set at 260 feet, two from the K-guns set at 150 feet. The time of this attack
was 0357.
Using standard procedure a relocation of the target was accomplished and the
target again developed for Screws, target width doppler and change of bearing,
The ship, sleepy and skeptical had come to their guns swiftly and without error.
No one, including the Commanding Officer could readily credit the existence of
an enemy submarine here on the steamer track and all soundmen, now on the
bridge, were attempting to argue the echo ranging equipment and chemical out of
such a fantastic idea.  Testing and evaluating the contact, the ship swept back
and forth, keeping the contact in range on either bow and beam. Sound conditions
were good and there was not any great interference.
When the Commanding Officer and the soundmen had finally completed
investigation, a third attack was made. A run of 700 yards at attack speed was
complicated by the failure of the chemical recorder. Stop watch range rates were
being kept and it was found that the attack was a quarter attack with a rate of
eight knots. Due to the rapid exhaustion of charges, only two were used with
settings of 200 feet.
Standard procedure failed to regain contact. Circling
- 3 -
area with a sharp lookout. At 0450, with dawn breaking over a glassy sea, a
lookout sighted a dark object about 700 yards from the ship on the starboard
beam. When inspected the object seemed to be moving. No definite conclusion
could be reached as to the identity of the object and the range was closed.
Although very probably this object was a floating log no chances were taken and
the target was used to test the guns which had not been heretofore fired
structurally. The gunners, most of whom were men of experience, displayed an
astonishing accuracy, bursts and shells converging on the target.
The target disappeared for several minutes and then, to test guns not brought to
bear on the first burst, the ship was turned in case the object reappeared. The
object appeared again closer to the ship. Once more fire was opened and the
target vanished.
It is stressed that no conclusion was reached by the Commanding Officer
concerning this target and it is thought likely that it was merely drift. The
effect upon morale was good and the ship was now assured that its newly
installed guns could work if needed.
Only three depth charges wore now left to the ship. The chemical recorder was
being  repaired by the sound technician. The next three attacks were therefore
parsimonious.
The fourth, fifth and sixth attacks were made in rapid succession with an eye to
harrass [sic] the submarine into surfacing, where it could be worked on with the
guns.
The fourth attack was started from a range of 800 yards. This was a beam attack
turning into a quarter (right moving) attacks. The range rate was eleven knots
when the quarter of the turning submarine was targeted. Suspecting an entire
reversement [sic] of the submarine course, the ship used slightly opposite lead
angle and then shifted rudder to lay the charge ahead and to the left of the
submarine, setting 150 feet. The contact was maintained throughout all but one
hundred yards of the run and was regained quickly, the submarine cutting back
and toward the explosion point.
- 4 -
Having maintained contact. the ship swerved back widely immediately after the
depth charge explosion and six minutes later laid its next charge, having
started its run from 600 yards. The submarine evidently attempted to turn in
toward the ship for the range rate jumped from a bow to a head on attack in a
very short distances. The one charge, set at 150 feet, was fired early to
anticipate the advance. This charge, however, missed by a good seventy-five
yards owing to the continued turning and speeding up of the submarine, as
established by quickly regained contact. Screw noises were very loud.
A standard sweep was used to lengthen the range and a 1200 yard run was
attempted but It was discovered owing to the depth (about 96 fathoms or slightly
less) or to some other sound condition that contact at this distance was
difficult to maintain. The range was closed back to 900 when good contact was
regained. The target was drawing right. The range rate was about twelve knots at
first. The submarine turned during the run and the range rate dropped to about
eight knots with the submarine's wake interfering considerably In the operation.
One charge was fired with a setting of 150 feet. This was our last charge.
Since out first establishment of the target as a submarine we had been sending
for help and ammunition. No reply was given us from anyone except "Roger". As
"Roger" could not be rolled off our racks the ship was forced to maintain
contact as best it could and hope for reinforcements. Sound conditions began to
grow poor.
At 0906 (see radio log) two U.S.N. anti-submarine blimps appeared, K-39 and
K-33. While we held contact they investigated and announced to us that they had
a magnetic contact where we were holding a sound contact. We tried to conn them
into a run but their conception of distance below them was often in error as
much as 500 yards. They continually confirmed our bearings.
At 1306 SC536 was sighted and was immediately informed of the situation. The USS
PC815 regained contact at 900 yards and took SC536 astern of her. With the
bullnose of the SC nearly against our flagstaff we came to attack course,
instructing the SC to lay her pattern on a signal from our whistle. Attacking
due north we found the submarine had been lying to. It started off and we heard
screw noises. Target width at 500 was about 15 degrees.
- 5 -
Target gave off screw noises for a moment and then screw noises ceased. The
attack was made, therefore, without lead angle. Allowance was made for the
distance between the PC projector of the sound head and the racks of the SC. The
whistle was blown and a five-charge pattern was laid.
The general conduct of the SC536 is here remarked upon. Her sound gear, WEA I
was not in good operating condition and Lieutenant (jg) Kroepke, USNR, then in
command (her assigned commanding officer did not arrive until several hours
after the last attack of the last day) showed brilliant judgment and seamanship.
The lag between blowing the whistle and his laying of the pattern was not more
than four seconds and all charges exploded. Lieutenant (jg) Kroepke executed all
orders with promptness and efficiency during formation steaming to sweep the
area later in the attacks as well as in laying his charges at our command.
Attention is invited to the radio logs of this period, from 1330 LWT to 1900
LWT. The observation blimps began to sight oil and air bubbles in the vicinity
of the last attack and finally a periscope. This ship also sighted air bubbles.
At 1600 the eighth attack was made, again by taking the SC536 astern and
bringing her over the target and signaling as before, The target was now very
deep and charges were set on maximum settings. The depth of the water in the
vicinity of these attacks was now about 90 fathoms. The target was moving right
at about three knots. Two charges were dropped.
At 1606 oil was reported again and this ship saw oil. Great air boils were seen
and the sound of blowing tanks was reported by the soundman.
During the action so far guns were all in a condition of readiness and at least
one watch. Condition Two, on duty with the 40MM always bearing and the 3”
usually. All guns were now manned with great attention as it was supposed that
the sub was trying to surface. Everyone was very calm, gunners joking about who
would get in the first shot.
- 6 -
At 1631, using the listening head (JK) to locate his target, the soundman on
duty, Beers, P.A. SoM3/c established definite contact, the SC was brought astern
once more and and [sic] a run was made. The chemical recorder was again in
operation. (See chemical recorder trace for this, the Ninth Attack).
The target was still blowing tanks and the water around it disturbed by air
bubbles. Two charges set for 200 feet were laid by the SC on our whistle signal.
About two hours earlier Beers, (above), had discovered a matter of interest by
accident. Beers proved himself throughout to be an extraordinarily sensitive and
interested soundman with great operational ability and was at the stack on
nearly all runs while the sound technician (Welch, Lonnie, SoM2/c) operated the
recorder and kept the equipment in a high state of repair/. [sic]
Beers had located a second contact. All our operation was on relative bearings
due to a failure at the yard to install a gyro repeater in our sound stack. The
steersman neglected to bring Beers ninety degrees right when the ship was turned
and Beers found himself pinging on a moving target with screws when he had
thought his target was blowing air and lying still. The Commanding Officer saw
the difficulty and immediately remedied the train of the sound head. Returning
to the first target which was motionless Beers examined it and found it to be as
before. He then examined the new target, or contact, and found it to be drawing
away at a speed of four knots. The extent of bearing was about nine degrees and
the range 420 yards. Opening doppler.
When the ninth attack was concluded more blowing was heard and oil was seen
coming to the surface and spreading.
Contact was sought on the new target but could not immediately be regained.
At 1646 the Coast Guard patrol boat 78302 came alongside with 23 depth charges
and needed equipment for them.  Within seven minutes all charges were
transferred and within nine minutes two were in our racks, set to be dropped. In
twenty-three minutes all charges were ready. This is remarked as a gauge of the
response of the PC’s crew.
While lying to, taking on these charges, echo ranging
- 7 -
was heard upon us. We were listening with the JK head and when we had located
the source, the bearing was found to be clear. All other sources either had not
arrived or could not operate sound gear.
About noon the Commanding Officer had concluded that the under submarine under
attack was unable to launch torpedos [sic] for the sea was smooth and the PC was
an excellent target.  Accordingly, lying to was no great concern.
When the QC head was directed toward the source of this pinging and the chemical
recorder turned on, no reception was noted and our pings were all that
registered upon the trace.  We were still in the water and the trace showed a
range rate (see photostat of trace). Contact passed within 150 yards of our
bows, from starboard to port.
At 1748, (see radio logs) the blimps reported sighting a periscope. This was
where charges were dropped earlier in the afternoon. Air boils were reported in
this spot and blowing tanks were again heard on our sound machine.
The final attack of the day was made on a non-sub target, the SC accompanying,
both ships dropping one charge.  (It has not been ascertained if the SC 536
dropped more, but only one was seen to explode). The charge was dropped near the
non sub target.
At 2010 the SC537 arrived on scene. The USSCG Bonham (NRWB in the radio logs)
had been on or around the scene since 1738. These two reinforcements seemed to
be reluctant to close to contact range and were usually well outside it.
Difficulty (see radio logs) was experienced with these two vessels either
because of their inexperience or unwillingness.  During the night of the 21st
when this vessel was attempting to make a routine sweep and search in the
standard sweep formation, neither the SC537 nor the USSCG Bonham showed any
understanding whatever and refused by their actions to cooperate.  It is later
understood that the Bonham had a top speed of 9.2 although she reported her
speed to us as 12 and that she was under the supposition that she would blow
herself up if she dropped charges. The SC537 had one contact which she reported
during the following day and failed to prosecute it.  The SC537 left the scene
with her racks full of charges although the SC536 and the PC815 had exhausted
all theirs.  Echo range was never more than about 900 yards in this shallow
water and despite orders neither vessel would close in to this with one
exception, as noted in the attacks as of the following morning.
- 8 -
During the afternoon of May 19 the SC536 had brought us orders from Astoria
Naval Station to secure and proceed on our original orders. We sought to protest
these when they were received but evidence seemed to point to plenty of people
being on the scene and so we secured reluctantly. We had no more than started
away when Comnowestseafron cancelled the Astoria Naval Station orders and
ordered us to remain on scene. We ascertained responsibility and came back to
the scene.
During the night vessels patrolled. The SC536 was ordered into an oil slick by
the blimp and air bubbles were seen rising from this. (See radio log). This was
in the scene of the final series of attacks of the day.
On May 20, 1943, at 1140 the blimp made contact with its magnetic gear and
dropped a smoke bomb. The USS PC815 came to general quarters from Condition II
and set out to cerify [sic] the blimp’s contact.
It may here be remarked that the coordination between surface ships and the
blimps was excellent. No attack was made, after the arrival of the blimps,
without verification of sound contact by magnetic or magnetic contact by sound.
Because her sound gear was not working properly (which fact she reported to us
several times) the SC536 stood by for us to verify. This teamwork, the blimp’s
smoke flares, and the use of echo ranging gear saved us many times from losing
contact.
Because we had three times found two sub targets on the previous day, we
considered from her failure to surface that she had gone down in 90 fathoms.
The other still had batteries well up for it made good speed in subsequent
attacks (three to six knots).
The wide searching of the blimps and surface ships had ringed the area,
blockading it.
An attack was made by the SC536 on a blimp magnetic contact about two hours
before the USS PC815 started out as above. (See radio log). Having inoperative
sound gear the SC536 used an oil slick and put charges to explode on the bottom,
letting go six charges in all.
On the blimp’s magnetic contact and dropped smoke bombs, the USS PC815 relocated
the contact and at 1305 made an attack on echo ranging equipment. This was
Attack XI. The PC attacked on course 320 True
- 9 -
and found an extent of bearing of 14 degrees. The contact had been carefully
investigated before attack and the submarine, evidently saving batteries, was
awaiting our attack before it speeded up. (See Trace 11). It was moving directly
away from our bows at a speed of about two knots during this long period of
investigation while we kept bare steerage way behind it. When satisfied as to
the identity of the target. having found screw noises. we came to attack speed
as swiftly as possible and the submarine was also heard to speed up (about five
seconds after we were ahead all engines flank.) The Commanding Officer has
checked this closely with the soundmen. The monotonous fluttering noise was not
to be confused with out own screws. We laid a five charge pattern while the
submarine was coming up to speed. Target was lost at 150 yards - 150 feet deep.
At the last moment it was seen that the submarine had right rudder on.
Accordingly we drew off, as part of this attack and closed again when the
chemical recorder was cut off as not registering distinct pings, Something, not
yet established, was wrong with this record until the following day and all
attacks hereafter were made on indicator lights and sound. (An additional reason
for this was the excellence of operation without recorder).
The PC815 swerved back. picked up contact. found the target going swiftly left
(PC now on reverse to first attack course) and dropped two more charges act at
300 feet from the racks.
Contact was lost at 350 yards. which seems to indicate that the target had dived
to that depth. Only a short time had elapsed between the two phases of this
attack, so short that the PC curved around one of her K-gun charges in getting
back to roll two more. The first charges exploded. by rough calculation. about
50 yards dead astern of the target, the next two probably came closer.
At 1342 another attack was made. Attack XIII. Ship was on a true course of 170.
The target course was 160 True. A small lead angle was applied to the left and
four charges were laid set at 300 feet.
The blimps were informed that the target, according to our sound data was
heading inshore into shallower water. The destination was predicted and the
blimp made magnetic contact in spot marked by explosion point for Attack XIV on
chart.
- 10 -
It was at this time (1420, May 20, see PC radio log) that K-33 who was on the
scene, gave command of all surface ships to the PC 815.
The PC approached the flare and smoke bomb where the blimp had made magnetic
contact and confirmed blimp's contact.
At 2000 the PC found a target under the blimp’s flares (see Attack XIV). Screw
noises were heard while PC lay to listening. The range was 400. Bottom noises
made the contact blurred but by changing angle of search a clear contact was
made. The blimp again confirmed magnetic contact.
At 2003, on true course 095 this vessel came to attack speed, range 500 yards,
using indicator light, sound and stop watch. Sub's course was found to be about
180 true, on which course the sub steadied. The shallowness of the water made it
necessary to set charges for 75 feet. The PC came in and dropped charges ahead
of the sub, then put her rudder hard right, pivoting around her starboard K-gun
charge and rolled two from the racks set for 150 feet.
The blimp X-33 then dropped into the explosion pattern. This vessel having
stretched other ships into line, attack was then made by them in rotation on
their sound contact. It is not known how accurate were their contacts. The
Bonham dropped on what she termed a poor contact. No record is available at this
writing for the positions of the vessels occupied in line or how many charges
they dropped. The SC536 seems to have gotten her WEA I into operation for a
short period here.
- 11 -
At 2034, when other vessels had cleared the attack area this vessel approached
the area and carefully sought to regain contact despite the disturbed water.
Just northwest of the depth charge slicks, at a distance of several hundred
yards, a contact with loud screw noises was regained. All other vessels were to
the south and west, most of the with engines stopped. E-33 dropped a flare to
mark his magnetic contact which concurred with our sound contact. This vessel
then took an attack course of 335 True and found herself on the port quarter of
the submarine which was making about 3 knots. A lead angle of five degrees was
applied and the charges dropped five seconds after the calculated time.
Blimps, and all surface vessels, searched the area without further contact.
The weather was still good but a slight wind had begun to spring up.
All during the following night, the USS PC815 kept the area swept as well as it
could. The moonlight showed up an oil slick which we investigated, though the
slick was too thin for samples.
It was very difficult trying to make the Bonham and the SC537 understand that
the area must be patrolled with sound gear in an orderly fashion to blockade it.
The patrol went from just south of Haystack Rock to north of Cape Lookout and
back again. The SC536 was placed all the way to seaward where the sub might be
expected to surface.
A report that the submarine had surfaced off Sand Lake (see Chart) caused all
vessels except the Bonham to go flying off to that position.  But before flank
speed was attained the reported “sub” was reported as a fishing vessel.  The
SC536 was detached to investigate, the Bonham assigned a lower area where she
would be out of the way and the patrol proceeded. For some time the SC537 was
remote from us and it has not been established why she had difficulty with this
ordered patrol.
At 0700, May 21,1943, being near the area of the attacks the night before, this
ship stopped to search. (See Chart for Attack XV).
- 12 -
At 0704 no contact had been made. This was due to having lately maneuvered here
to pick up a strange object, a small round ball laced with a line netting, which
was floating here. Turbulence caused by our screws prevented echo ranging.
Suddenly a boil of orange colored oil, very thick, came to the surface
immediately on our port bow. The Commanding Officer was aft where he had been
trying to get the strange marker aboard with the help of his men.
The watch had been piped down for chow and due to the quietness of the area the
opportunity had been taken to ease the barrel springs on the port 20MM and cock
the starboard 20MM.
Ensign Wiemers, USNR, was Officer of the Deck., the Commanding Officer having
had the conn since the beginning of the action on the morning of May 19th.
Ensign Wiemers instantly sighted the oil boil and sounded General Quarters,
shouting to gunners to get guns ready to fire.
The Commanding Officer came forward on the double and saw a second boil of
orange oil rising on the other side of the first.
The soundman was loudly reporting that he heard tanks being blown on the port
bow.
Every man on the bridge and flying bridge then saw the periscope, moving from
right to left to a height of about two feet. The barrel and lense [sic] of the
instrument were unmistakable.
By efficient and swift work. Coates, C.C, SC2/c had gotten the forward 20MM
loaded and Lacey, W.K., GM2/c had the Port 20MM ready to fire. This in some
fifteen to twenty seconds. Both are expert gunners.
On the appearance of the periscope both gunners, Lacey and Coates, fired
straight into the periscope, range about fifty yards. The periscope vanished in
an explosion of 20MM bullets. It cannot be ascertained if the periscope was hit.
As the ship was dead in the water, charges could not be immediately dropped. The
sub had been turning as if to get back under the ship. Only two charges were
left to us, one loaded in a K-gun on the wrong side.
- 13 -
We called ships to the area. There were so few charges left to any of us that we
wished the next attack to be final and concerted.
The appearance of another orange oil boil ahead of us caused us to open out the
range and gather speed and then search back for the contact. We could not
establish contact though we searched the area in wide sweeps.
It was then reported to the Commanding Officer that both main engines would have
to be stopped to replace relief valves. This was not unusual for depth charging
and unaccustomed stress had showed up much slackness in the installation.
Permission was granted to shut down one engine at a time for no longer than ten
minutes.
During this period 20 minutes after all engines had been stopped, the soundman
on duty, Beers, requested search orders and was given 360 degrees by way of
novelty.  His first ping found contact dead astern of us. The wind drifted us to
starboard and the contact remained stationary. We examined the contact and
developed it. It was the submarine lying to, evidently having followed hard in
our wake. The main engines were reported repaired.
We drew off, swiftly, and came to attack course, The first range was about 900
yards. When we came up to speed we cut in the chemical recorder. (See trace 18)
(See chart Attack XV). The submarine turned to the left and gave us her port
quarter and then nearly her port beam.  Her screws were very plain. Change of
bearing was to the left. Moderate doppler. A lead angle was applied (attack
course 335 T,) to steady on 315 True. Charges set for 200 feet. Fired by
recorder. Two charges. Contact lost at 250 yards.
A marked explosion met this attack concurrent with the depth charge explosions.
The target was then examined when regain contact procedure had been executed.
The blimp examined the target and confirmed. The SC536 was brought up to the
scene and taken in behind us. We examined the target from a range of 520 yards.
At 1005 we started attack XVI. The SC536 was led astern of us. The first range
at attack speed was 700. Attack speed 12 knots. The target was moving straight
away from us on course C75. Her speed was very low.
- 14 -
Some difficulty was experienced in pinging through the sub wake and for this
reason the chemical recorder was not cut in for this run.
There was no change of bearing. Target width was about six degrees. Moderate
opening inclination.
On stop watch a range rate of 9 knots was established and the ship speed was 12
knots.
On whistle signal the SC laid her charges. The Commanding Officer of the PC then
swarmed up on the signal bridge and saw that the SC was nearly 75 yards behind.
The Commanding Officer then blew another signal when seventy five yards had run
on his atop watch which was still running. The SC then laid a second barrage.
The first barrage exploded. by calculation, just astern of the submarine. The
second barrage exploded on its bow as nearly as could be judged.
All the charges of the SC and the PC 815 had then been expended.
A search formation was taken up and no sign of the submarine could be found
through 360 degrees.
A patrol formation was organized. The CG Bonham was secured after transferring
her charges to the 537. A long blockage was formed around the area when no
further contact could be gained.
The weather was getting bad with low visibility and a moderate sea running. Rain
was coming down Intermittently.
The PC ran up the coast on its sector and came upon the USS 778. The 778 had
orders. according to Captain Barner, which permitted her to join the attack, but
she protested very strongly against helping. She was finally brought into some
sort of sweeping formation which she held raggedly, requesting continually to be
allowed to be secured. She was led down to the spot of the last attack for she
had fifty depth charges.
- 15 -
Contact was regained on a questionable target in the area of the last attack
(See Attack XVI).
The contact was metallic, had a width of bearing of 15 degrees at 900 yards and
was evidently on the bottom. There was a strong echo. The drifting of this ship
made it appear for a moment that the target had a range rate of 11 knots but
this was shortly established as an effect of wind and current. The contact,
whatever it was, showed no inclination and change. But it narrowed to five
degrees at 400 yards while we circled it and then widened to fifteen as we came
around it, narrowed again and widened again.
We gave the PC778 explicit directions on the contact. We were motionless in the
water. We tried to pass the contact over to the PC778. She failed to get the
contact, mainly because she was over a thousand yards from it and did not come
up.  At this depth (about thirty-two to thirty-six fathoms, with the rough sea)
the contact could not be held at that distance. She failed to allow for drift
and finally we recalled her to keep her from going aground and sent her on her
away with her fifty charges. She would not part with any charges or any part of
them although this presented no problem, the sea being calm enough her [sic] to
allow an SC to take off an officer from her without the use of boats. Orders
from Comnowestseafron came via another SC which said we could not have the 778.
In the late afternoon, just before sunset we ran a horizon patrol. The
visibility was shutting down steadily but we wished to keep any sub, if any were
left, from surfacing or running away.
Twelve hours after the last attack the area was still calm. The contact above
mentioned was still there but we could do nothing about it.  [crossed out – The
SC537 still had charges but evidently could not use her sound gear and would not
close.]
At midnight we were secured by orders received from Comnowestseafron, and
returned to Astoria, arriving at daylight the morning of the 22nd of May.
Total time in contact with submarines was 55 consecutive hours. (55 hours and 27
minutes)
Total time in area searching was 68½ hours. (68 hours and thirty-seven minutes).
- 16 -
Total depth charges expended by this vessel, 37.
Total casualties, 3, all very minor.
Materiel casualties, numerous, all minor, mainly to engines. The engines were
repaired on the scene with the parts at hand whenever they broke down.
Failure on the part of a gunner to properly assemble the parallelogram of the
starboard 20MM (he reversed it) caused this gun to go off when pointed at the
zenith and expend a full magazine, cutting away our antennaes [sic].  The gun
was not at the time manned.
PERONNEL CONDUCT REPORT
All personnel behaved with uniform attention to duty. Calmly and cheerfully,
despite lack of sleep, all hands executed their required duties with efficiency.
No man is singled out for praise for to praise one would be to praise all.
No man is censured for no man required censure.
A report on the officers is submitted as follows:
USNR
Lieutenant T.S. Moulton USNR, Executive Officer, handled Communications and Fire
Control for the guns during the action. He showed zeal and imagination in the
execution of duty and displayed his ability to receive and carry out orders
promptly.  He is considered a valuable officer, deserving of a command of his
own.
Ensign D.E. Walker, USNR, Gunnery Officer, stayed hard by his post as Gunnery
Officer and personally supervised the handling of depth charges. His feat of
assembling 23 depth charges in 23 minutes, of having two ready in the racks two
minutes after transfer was completely effected, deserves mention as a record.
The firing lag of depth charges was cut down to a fractional amount by his
timing and more than once his example caused such accurate dropping that two
and, once, three charge, exploded simultaneously. There was no depth charge
failure except for the structural firing charges which were already in the guns.
- 17 -
Ensign M.E. Wiemers., USNR, First Lieutenant, carried out all orders efficiently
and promptly. He was diligent in maintaining the materiel condition Affirm
throughout the action. He spent long stretches of duty as Officer of the Deck
and in this respect was especially trusted. His performance of duty had no
highlights. It was uniformly dependable and quietly effective. He has proved
himself to be an able officer, a good ship handler and, in all, a valuable part
of this ship. An early promotion to Lieutenant (junior grade) is recommended for
this officer.
SUMMARY
When this ship returned to port under the orders of Comnowestseafron, she was
received with considerable skepticism. Her records had not been examined, her
crew had not been questioned and no qualified report had been made.
This ship was handicapped by the lack of outside aid from anti-submarine warfare
officers. The only anti-submarine warfare officer present being Lieutenant
(junior grade) Kroepke of the SC536. This officer, naturally able, and trained
in ASW was our biggest help while in command of the SC536.  When the regular
commanding officer of that ship was brought to it by the PC778, cooperation from
that direction ceased.
The captains of K-39 and K-33 were diligent, particularly the latter whenever he
assumed command, but they showed a deep blank on the usual knowledge of ASW one
might expect of them.  They did, however, beautiful coordination work when
cooperating with surface ships.
The radio intercepts from shore stations near the scene were garbled because the
blimps operated on 5 watts and could not reach. Therefore only a fragment of
their orders, confirmations. etc. reached shore stations, The garbled conditions
of such logs seemed to be due to static.  This garble led to erroneous opinions.
The Astoria Naval Station did all possible to aid. Additional ammunition was not
sent because the bar was running too high after the first load of 23 charges was
delivered.
- 18 -
The U.S.S. PC815 was manned by S.C.T.C. trained officers and petty officers,
experienced in handling ASW vessels or at least closely instructed.
The sound equipment of the U.S.S. PC815 is QCS and was easily the best, probably
the only, efficient sound gear on the scene, well cared for and well-manned.
All attack conning was done by the Commanding Officer as well as all usual
conning during the period of attacks, search and patrol. With due allowance for
lack of rest, all attacks were conducted and operated on standard procedure on
the doctrine of Fleet Sound School. Key West. Florida.
This vessel appreciates the favor of Comnowestseafron for allowing it to remain
on the scene and later, for the interview.
CLAIM:
It is specifically claimed that one submarine, presumably Japanese, possibly a
mine-layer, was damaged beyond ability to leave the scene and that one
submarine, presumably Japanese, possibly a mine layer, was damaged beyond
ability to return to its base.
This vessel has requested permission to search for possible wrecks on the bottom
to bouy [sic] them to be swept for or dived for. It is the opinion of this
vessel that at least one wreck may be found, near the scene of the last attacks
or in the vicinity of attacks VII, VIII, and IX, in 92 fathoms of water. Due to
stress of attack or later attempts to get away, these positions may not mark,
exactly, the locality or any wreck.
This vessel wishes no credit for itself. It was built to hunt submarines. Its
people were trained to hunt submarines. Although exceeding its orders in
originally attacking the first contact, this vessel feels only that it has done
the job for which it was intended and stands ready to do that job again.
L. Ron Hubbard
Lieutenant., D-V(S)., USNR
Commanding U.S.S. PC815
IN REPLY REFER
TO NO.
U. S. S. PC-815
May 25, 1943.
From:  The Executive Officer.
To:      The Commanding Officer.
Subject:            Report, After Battle.
Reference: (a) Article 9480 U.S. Navy Regulations, 1920,
1.         In accordance with reference (a), the following is submitted.
2.         Details of the action. having been more than adequately covered in
the battle report are not discussed., except to corroborate.
5.         From listening to sound gear, with which the Executive Officer has
had considerable experience, from surface evidences seen personally, such as
boils produced by blowing of tanks, quantities of oil, and the general character
of the action itself, the following conclusions are drawn:
(1) During the period from 0300, Tuesday, April 18, 1943, until 2400, Friday,
April 21, 1943, the U.S.S. P.C. 815 fought two submarines, presumably Japanese.
(2) That one of them was definitely sunk, beyond doubt.
(3) That the second was damaged beyond repair and may therefore be considered as
not capable of returning to Japanese territory.
4.         It is recommended that each officer, junior to myself, and each
enlisted man, have placed in his record a letter of commendation for his conduct
in this action; considering coolness, stamina and general ability. The Executive
Officer feels no particular person is outstanding beyond any other.
5. No comments of a censuring nature are made.
THOMAS S. MOULTON.
IN REPLY REFER
TO NO.
U. S. S. PC-815
GUNNERY LOG
L.W.T.            Wednesday, 19 May, 1943
0344  - Fired both X-guns setting 75 feet
Rolled three from racks - settings were 2 at 100 feet and one at 50 feet
0357  - Fired both K-guns - setting 150 feet
Rolled two from racks - settings at 200 feet
0422  - Fired both X-guns -settings at 200 feet
0450  - Fired all guns at object on surface
0500  - Fired all guns at object on surface
0520  - Rolled one from racks – settings at 150 feet
0526  - Rolled one from racks - setting at 150 feet
0545  - Rolled one from racks - setting at 150 feet
This expended all our depth charges.
1700  - C. G. C. 78-302 came alongside to give us 23 complete depth charges
1850  - Rolled one from racks-setting at 150 feet
THURSDAY, 20 May 1943
1305  - Fired two from K-guns - setting at 300 feet
Rolled four from racks - settings at 300 feet
1342  - Fired two from K-guns - settings at 300 feet
Rolled two from racks - settings at 3X feet
1601  - Fired two from K-guns - settings at 75 feet
Rolled one from racks - setting at 75 feet
2003    Fired two from K-guns - settings at 75 feet
Rolled one from racks - setting at 75 feet
2006    Rolled two from racks - setting at 150 feet
2034    Fired two from K-guns - setting at 150 feet
IN REPLY REFER
TO NO.
U. S. S. PC-815
GUNNERY LOG
L.W.T.            FRIDAY, 21 May, 1943
0704  -            Opened fire from all guns at periscope in the center of oil
boil.
Continued firing until the periscope disappeared.
0805  - Fired port K-gun – settings at 200 feet
Rolled one from racks - setting at 200 feet
AMMUNITION INVENTORY
A full allowance of ammunition was on hand when this vessel sailed from Astoria
on May 18, 1943 in all respects except depth charges.
This vessel had strongly requested its full allowance of depth charges but
received only fourteen, two of which were structural firing charges. It is
believed that this was no fault of this naval station but came about through a
lack of supply from Navy Yard Puget Sound or wherever this naval station
receives it [sic] charges and ordnance. There were no more depth charges than
this to be given to this vessel. This station was most generous with arbors.
D.E. Walker
Ensign, USNR
Gunnery Officer, USS PC815
HEADQUARTERS
NORTHWEST SEA FRONTIER
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON
A16-3(3)/PC815
(R1-s)
Serial F223026
8 June 1943
SECRET
SECOND ENDORSEMENT on
CO USS PC815 ltr PC815/
A16-3(167) dated 24 May 1943.
From:            Commander Northwest Sea Frontier
To:            Commander in Chief., Pacific Fleet
Via:            Commander Fleet Operational Training Command., Pacific
Subject:            Battle Report - Submission of.
1. At the time of the incident reported herein PC 815 was enroute [sic] to San
Diego, California, in accordance with orders of Commander Fleet Operational
Training Command, Pacific.
2. It is noted that the report of PC 815 is not in accordance with
“Anti-Submarine Action by Surface Ship" (ASW-1) which should be submitted to
Commander In Chief, U.S. Fleet.
3. SC’s 536 and 537, CGC’s BONHAM and 78302, and blimps K-33 and K-39 engaged in
this submarine search. Reports have been received from the Commanding Officer of
each of these ships in writing and in personal interviews. An oral report has
also been received from Lieutenant Commander E. J. Sullivan U.S.N., Commander
Airship Squadron 33, who made a trip to the area during the search on one of the
blimps.
4. There is a known magnetic deposit in the area in which depth charges were
dropped.
5. An analysis of all reports convinces me that there was no submarine in the
area. Lieutenant Commander Sullivan states that he was unable to obtain any
evidence of a submarine except one bubble of air which is unexplained except by
turbulence of water due to a depth charge explosion. The Commanding Officers of
all ships except the PC 815 state they had no evidence of a submarine and do not
think a submarine was in the area.
6. Transmission of this letter by registered mail is necessary and is
authorized.
FRANK JACK FLETCHER